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FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE CASE OF
THE "CORRUPT" CAMPAIGN PROMISE
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of speech' deservedly occupies its preferred posi-
tion2 among constitutional values and warrants the keenest judi-
cial protection. 3 The freedom is not an absolute one4 and its exact
limits have not yet been defined, 5 but its significance is clear. As
' "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .... U.S.
CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
2 The earliest placement of first amendment freedoms in a "preferred position"
came in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 600, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). The
view was made explicit in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). Justice
Frankfurter criticized use of this terminology in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), but the Court is nonetheless solicitous of first amendment
freedoms. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1939); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937). For a discussion of the preeminence of first amendment free-
doms and various Court-adopted techniques and doctrines to ensure it, see McKay, The
Preferencefor Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182 (1959).
3 The Court exercises strict scrutiny of legislation when fundamental interests like
first amendment freedoms are involved. E.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 98-99 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama ex tel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 114, 152 n.4 (1938). This level of scrutiny
is more intense and less deferential to legislative enactments than the minimal scrutiny
given post-1937 economic legislation, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz,
449 U.S. 166 (1980), or the middle level of scrutiny given classifications based on sex or il-
legitimacy, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (illegitimacy); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (sex).
4 The debate between the "absolutists" and the "balancers" has raged both on and
off the Court. The prevailing view is illustrated by the statements of Justice Harlan ("[W]e
reject the view that freedom of speech and association ... are 'absolutes' .. " Konigs-
berg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)) and Justice Holmes ("The most stringent protec-
tion of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing
a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). In contrast, Justice Black ar-
ticulated the absolutist approach in Konigsberg: "I believe that the First Amendments un-
equivocal command ... shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the
'balancingr that was to be done." 366 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., dissenting). For general discus-
sions of the absolute-balancing dispute, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
(1962); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Mendel-
son, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV.
821 (1962).
5 For competing views on the historical meaning of freedom of speech in America,
see Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) (first amendment designed to
wipe out the common law crime of seditious libel); L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960) (repudiating Chafee's
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Justice Cardozo concluded, "[freedom of speech] is the matrix,
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of free-
dom." 6
The Court's protective posture toward speech, especially in
the political area,7 is reflected in many decisions." In the words of
Justice Black:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the
First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes
discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government,
the manner in which government is operated or should be op-
erated, and all such matters relating to political processes.9
Against this background, the United States Supreme Court has
recently 10 decided Brown v. Hartlage, " a Kentucky case concern-
ing the constitutional status of a political candidate's campaign
promise to serve for less than the salary set by state law. 12
view). Other general scholarly works on freedom of speech include A. BICKEL, supra note
4; T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1970); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-COVERNMENT (1948).
6 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. at 327.
7 Various commentators focus on the special quality of political speech. E.g., A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 5 (two-tiered approach arguing absolute protection for discussion
of public issues, but protection of other forms of speech limitedto that afforded by due
process considerations); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry
Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299 (1978) (political speech is
primary but institutional and pragmatic concerns justify wider scope of protection); Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (advocates
strict political speech principle and excludes advocacy of government overthrow).
8 E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[D]ebate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open .... ); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("[Freedom of expression] was fashioned to assure unfettered in-
terchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people."); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) ("[Ilt is a prized American priv-
ilege to speak one's mind ... on all public institutions."); Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discus-
sion ... is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.").
9 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
10 The decision was rendered on April 5, 1982. Brown v. Hartlage, No. 80-1285
(U.S. Apr. 5, 1982).
11 Hartlage v. Brown, No. 79CI-11292 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Feb. 6, 1980), rev'd No.
80-CA-385-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1980), reh'g denied, No. 80-CA-385-MR (Ky. Ct.
App. Oct. 29, 1980), discretionary rev. denied sub nom. Brown v. Hartlage, No. 80-SC-
770-D (Ky. Dec. 9, 1980), rev'd, No. 80-1285 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982).
12 The free speech constitutional guarantee is applicable to the states through the
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The case, which is one of first impression for the Court, 13 has
profound constitutional implications. Brown involves an incum-
bent Jefferson County Commissioner, Earl J. Hartlage, who was
defeated by Carl W. Brown in an election for one of the commis-
sion seats. Hartlage successfully contested the election in the
Kentucky courts on the ground that Brown's campaign statement
that he would reduce the salary of the office violated Kentucky's
Corrupt Practices Act. 14 The important question in Brown is
fourteenth amendment. E.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
13 Newspaper columnist James J. Kilpatrick said of the case: "It is incredible, but
there it is.... [Tihe case is the most unheard-of-thing I ever heard of .... The Courier-
Journal, Sept. 8, 1981, § A, at 7, col. 1 (Metro Edition). The Jefferson Circuit Court ob-
served: "Previously, the Court faintly criticized Brown for saying that the law is silly.
Therefore, the Court will refer to the law as unique when the Court tries to grasp the
reasoning bf the legislature .... Hartlage v. Brown, No. 79CI-11292, slip op. at 8 (Jef-
ferson Cir. Ct. Feb. 6, 1980).
14 On November 6, 1979, Carl W. Brown defeated Earl J. Hartlage in an election for
Jefferson County Commissioner by a plurality of 10,151 votes (out of a total of 177,501
votes cast). The text of the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act reads as follows:
No candidate for nomination or election to any state, county, city or
district office shall expend, pay, promise, loan or become pecuniarily liable
in any way for money or other thing of value, either directly or indirectly, to
any person in consideration of the vote or financial or moral support of that
person. No such candidate shall promise, agree or make a contract with any
person to vote for or support any particular individual, thing or measure, in
consideration for the vote or the financial or moral support of that person in
any election, primary or nominating convention, and no person shall re-
quire that any candidate make such a promise, agreement or contract.
KY. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 121.055 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. The pro-
mise by Brown, made in a televised press conference on August 15, 1979, was as follows:
We abhor the commissioners outrageous salaries. And to prove the
strength of our convictions, one of our first official acts as county commis-
sioners will be to lower our salaries to a more realistic level. We will lower
our salaries, saving the taxpayers $36,000 during our first term of office, by
$3,000 each per year.
Four days later, the pledge was retracted in another televised press conference because
Brown was advised that prior Kentucky court decisions had deemed such promises illegal.
The matter was tried before the Jefferson Circuit Court in Hartlage v. Brown, No. 79CI-
11292 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Feb. 6, 1980). The trial court found a violation of KBS § 121.055
but held that the election should not be voided. The trial court found the promise a viola-
tion based on the controlling case of Sparks v. Boggs, 339 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1960) (where
the salary of an elected public office is fixed by law, a candidate's offer to serve for less is
akin to a bribe and is a violation of the Corrupt Practices Act). The trial court ruled to up-
hold Brown's election, despite the violation, based on KRS § 120.165(4) (1982), which
provides in pertinent part:
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whether a campaign promise to serve for less than the statutory
salary's is constitutionally protected political speech, or corrupt
speech, akin to a bribe, endangering the integrity of the electoral
process and thus justifying state prohibition. The Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky construed Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
section 121.055 to prohibit such promises. The Supreme Court
disagreed. 16
This Comment first analyzes principles of free speech adjudi-
cation in order to give content to the abstractions "freedom of
speech" and "political speech," and concludes that the campaign
promise at issue in Brown is clearly included within the concepts.
The second section of the Comment considers two constitutional
If it appears from an inspection of the whole record that there has been
such.. . bribery. . . in the conduct of the election that neither contestant
nor contestee can be judged to have been fairly elected, the circuit
court.. . may adjudge that there has been no election .... If one of the
parties is adjudged by the court to be elected to the office, he shall... be
permitted to qualify or be commissioned.
Applying the provision, the trial court held that Brown was fairly elected based upon:
1) the almost immediate retraction, by Brown;
2) no subsequent retreat by Brown from the retraction;
3) balancing the violation against disenfranchisement of thousands of votes;
4) the presumption of the will of the people in the election process; and
5) the defeat of Dr. Creech, Brown's running mate, who had made the same
statements in the same county-wide election.
Hartlage v. Brown, No. 79CI-11292, slip op. at 8 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Feb. 6, 1980).
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that balancing inter-
ests was inappropriate and that the election was automatically void pursuant to KRS §
120.015. Hartlage v. Brown, No. 80-CA-385-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1980), reh'g de-
nied, No. 80-CA-385-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1980), discretionary rev. denied sub
nom. Brown v. Hartlage, No. 80-SC-770-D (Ky. Dec. 9, 1980), rev'd, No. 80-1285 (U.S.
Apr. 5, 1982). KRS § 120.015 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
In any contest over the nomination or election of any state, county,
city or district officer, it may be alleged. . . that the provisions of
KRS... 121.055... have been violated by the contestee... and [if] it
appears that such provisions have been violated by the contestee. . . , the
nomination or election of the contestee shall be declared void.
15 Brown contended the salary was not fixed by law and so his promise did not go
against the Sparks rationale. The Kentucky courts, however, held that the county commis-
sioner's salary was set by law. The United States Supreme Court has exercised independent
factual review in a number of first amendment opinions. E.g., Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203, 230 (1961). But the Court did not rest its decision on this narrow point. For a
discussion of Supreme Court review of factual bases of state court judgments, see Note, Su-
preme Court Review of State Court Findings of Fact, 55 HARv. L. BEy. 644 (1942).
16 Brown v. Hartlage, No. 80-1285 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brown
v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision)].
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tests that are often applied in freedom of speech cases, the "clear
and present danger" test 17 and the "compelling state interest"
test, 8 and concludes that the campaign statement in Brown
could be deemed constitutionally protected political speech un-
der either test. Finally, this Comment examines the Supreme
Court decision in Brown and concludes that the Court correctly
applied the compelling state interest test in holding the Kentucky
statute unconstitutional as applied to Brown's campaign pro-
mise.'9 A somewhat frustrating balancing approach, represented
by the compelling state interest test or the clear and present dan-
ger test,20 is the only solution to the tension inherent in a concep-
tion of freedom of speech which is at once preferred yet not abso-
lute.
I. BACKGROUND: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND POLITICAL EXPRESSION
The United States Supreme Court distinguishes between reg-
ulation of "speech" and regulation of expressive "conduct."' Ac-
cordingly, the Court has fashioned a somewhat less strenuous
constitutional test for regulation that does not involve a direct
suppression of speech.2 Any attempt, however, to characterize
17 See notes 36-65 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the clear and
present danger test.18 See notes 66-84 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of the compelling
state interest test.
19 See notes 85-103 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court decision in Brown.
20 Controversy surrounds the question whether the clear and present danger test is
also a balancing test or not. Strictly speaking, the focus of the test is on the speech itself and
whether it endangers the interest sought to be protected. This author believes, however,
that balancing is the essence of the judicial process; the clear and present danger test
cannot altogether avoid encompassing some weighing and measuring of competing values.
In other words, an informed and judicious balancing approach, firmly based on the pre-
mise of a constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, is the best of all possible ap-
proaches. See notes 35 and 38 infra for further discussion of this point and a history of the
clear and present danger test.
2' The Court has specifically stated that "[the first amendment does not] afford the
same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrol-
ling, marching, and picketing.., as ... to those who communicate ideas by pure
speech." Cox v. Louisiana,379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). See Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme
Court Decision), slip op. at 9 ("The fact that.., an agreement [to engage in illegal con-
duct] necessarily takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or the underlying con-
duct, the constitutional immunities that the First Amendment extends to speech.").
2 The so-called O'Brien test is derived from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
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the prohibition of a campaign promise to serve at a reduced sal-
ary as a regulation of the "conduct" of campaigning must fail.
The prohibition of a campaign promise is directly aimed at sup-
pressing the harmful and corrupt communication allegedly im-
plicit in the promise.2 Thus, the constitutionality of the prohibi-
tion must survive the most exacting scrutiny,' scrupulously ap-
plied in the area of political expression.25
Political speech is a category 26 of protected speech because its
377 (1968). The case concerned a draft card burning in which the Court noted "that when
.speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a suffi-
ciently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitation on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376. The Court upheld the
conviction for draft card burning because it found that the government's administrative
interest in having draft cards intact was wholly unrelated to their use as a means of com-
munication. Id. at 382. A governmental regulation of expressive conduct meets the
O'Brien standard
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377. See Comment, Freedom of Expression-When May the Government Regulate
the Public Expression of Ideas? 25 Loy. L. REv. 395 (1979), for a discussion of recent cases
involving the conduct-speech distinction and regulations based on content of speech.
23 Compare Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(attempt to ban utility company from placing inserts dealing with controversial public is-
sues, i.e., nuclear power, into billing envelopes held unconstitutional and theory which
characterized the ban as unrelated to the suppression of speech rejected) and Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (state interest in regulating campaign contributions arises be-
cause the communication allegedly implicit in the contribution is thought harmful) with
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (the required elements to activate the O'Brien
test).
24 See note 3 supra for a discussion of the strict scrutiny concept.
25 See notes 7-8 supra for a discussion of the preferred status of political speech. It
should be noted that the Court has explicitly recognized that freedom of speech involves
more than "political" discussion of governmental affairs; it also embraces the individual's
interest in self-fulfillment. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 nn.11-12
(1978).
2 The method of categorizing certain forms of speech gained Court approval in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942), when obscenity, fighting
words and offensive speech, and libel were deemed outside constitutional protection.
Commercial speech was soon added to the unprotected categories. Valentine v. Chresten-
sen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). While the Court has generally adhered to the principle that these
categories present special problems which permit some control of content, Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971), the Court has retreated from total exclusion and erected
first amendment barriers to government control. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (libel of public officials context); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (cast
doubt on the viability of the "fighting words" doctrine); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacyv.
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"political" content 7 is presumed to be at the core of first amend-
ment values. The Court provides this special protection especial-
ly when speech is expressed in the context of the "free discussion
of governmental affairs" 2s and "debate on public issues" 29 which
enables the "citizenry to make informed choices among candi-
dates."r' e Whatever difficulty exists in defining the outer boun-
daries of political speech, the Court has placed campaign state-
ments within the boundaries, stating that "it is of particular im-
portance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to
make their views known."'3 There have been limits, however, to
the protection afforded political speech when the speech presents
a clear and present danger to the very foundation of the constitu-
tional system that freedom of speech is designed to enhance. The
justification for the prohibition of the campaign promise to serve
at a reduced salary rested on the assumption that the promise is a
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (recognized first amend-
ment protection of commercial speech). But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(obscenity still unprotected).
27 The Court has adopted two basic approaches, one based on content and the other
content-neutral, in establishing the constitutional boundaries of freedom of speech. The
following passage from the Court's decision in Konigsberg describes the Court's tradition-
al methodology:
Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two
ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than
an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or
speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitu-
tional protection.... On the other hand, general regulatory statutes, not
intended to control content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered
exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth
Amendment forbad Congress or the States to pass, when they have been
found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests.
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. at 49-51. For discussions dealing with content-based
classifications and the constitutional principle of content-neutrality, see Farber, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Com-
ment, Content-Based Classifications of Protected Speech: A Less Vital Interest?, 1976
UTAH L. REV. 616.
28 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. at 218.
29 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
30 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15. Accord Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265, 272 (1971) ("[The freedom] has its fullest and most urgent application.., to the
conduct of campaigns for political office.")
31 424 U.S. at 52-53. Justice Black once labeled as "farfetched" the idea that "a valid
law could be enacted to punish a candidate ... for telling the people his views." Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting). See Brown v. Hartlage
(Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 11-13.
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corruption of the electoral process and an attempt to subvert the
voters and buy the office. 32 It is the author's opinion that such a
blanket assumption applied to these or similar facts is unwar-
ranted and that such campaign promises should be analyzed in
terms of the constitutional standards embodied in the clear and
present danger test or the compelling state interest test.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TESTS
Even though the Court could have found the Kentucky sta-
tute void on overbreadth grounds,33 it analyzed Brown's promise
32 Kentucky is not the only state to view the promise as a corruption of the electoral
process. See Annot., 106 A.L.R. 493 (1937). Part of the rationale for this view is that since
a salary is fixed by law and paid by taxation, a promise to serve for less than the fixed
amount is an offer to reduce taxes which, in effect, is an offer to pay for the elector's vote.
The most recent case, other than the Kentucky Sparks decision, holding the promise to be
against public policy is Tipton v. Sands, 60 P.2d 622 (Mont. 1936) (but good faith is a de-
fense). A recent California case touched on the problem. In Anderson v. County of Santa
Barbara, 128 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1976), the court held that first amendment interests take pre-
cedence wherever they conflict with provisions of the state election code and that an elec-
tion cannot be contested based on statements that "fall short of specific promises or threats
conditioned on a certain vote." Id. at 712. There are United States Supreme Court deci-
sions that lend support to the argument that an attempt to change a statutory salary is
against public policy. United States v. Andrews, 240 U.S. 90 (1916); Glavey v. United
States, 182 U.S. 595 (1901). These cases deal with appointed officers, however, and do not
involve any first amendment interest which must be weighed in terms of the actual impact
a campaign promise has on the purity of the election process.
33 As stated above, in deciding Brown v. Hartlage the Court could have avoided de-
ciding the exact constitutional status of the campaign promise by reversing on overbreadth
grounds and holding that KRS § 121.055 (1982), as construed by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, could be so susceptible to application to other clearly protected campaign pro-
mises that the statute would be unconstitutional. This technique is a prominent one in first
amendment cases as an alternative to deciding difficult questions. The modem Court has
repeatedly invoked the principle that "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activ-
ities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). Under the overbreadth approach,
normal standing rules are relaxed so that a litigant whose own activities are unprotected
may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the first
amendment rights of other parties. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). There are
two variations of the overbreadth theme--"as applied" and "facial overbreadth." The "as
applied" approach exhibits more judicial restraint by looking at the particular challenger
and holding the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. The "on its face" approach
strikes down the law entirely because it might be applied to others not before the Court
whose activities are definitely protected, regardless of whether the speech in that partic-
ular instance is protected. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HAtv. L. REv. 844 (1970); Comment, Constitutional Law-The Fine Line Between Pro-
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under the compelling state interest test.4 Although the compell-
ing state interest test is the better approach in measuring the con-
stitutional protection to be afforded such a promise, the clear
and present danger tests could have served as an alternative
analysis.
tected Speech and Nonprotected Speech-McCall v. State, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 749
(1979). See also Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). Thus, in evaluating the constitutional status of the campaign pro-
mise to serve for a reduced salary, the Court could have avoided deciding on the facts in
Brown that Brown's promise was protected speech. It could have instead struck down the
statute in toto because of its potential application to clearly protected campaign promises
without actually deciding whether the salary reduction promise was protected speech.
34 See notes 66-84 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the compelling
state interest test.
-5 The history of the test is largely the history of the Court's attempt to refine the
constitutional boundaries of government control over "subversive speech," believed to en-
danger the safety of the nation. During the period of anti-radical sentiment surrounding
the First World War, Justice Holmes first formulated the clear and present danger test in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52. Holmes stated: "The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Con-
gress [or a state] has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree." Id. Thus,
the focus was on the speech itself and technically involved no balancing of interests. A few
years later in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. at 667, the Court applied a "tendency" test
holding that freedom of speech "does not protect publications or teachings which tend to
subvert or imperil the government." Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented in Gitlow in-
sisting on a showing of immediate danger based on the actual content and context of the
speech. Id. at 673 (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). The anti-communism period of
the 1950's began with a loose application of the clear and present danger test. In Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the Court construed the test to mean "whether the
gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as
is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 510 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d
201,212 (2d Cir. 1950)). Thus, the Dennis court did adopt an explicit balancing approach
which weighed the possible danger against the free speech interest. Subsequent cases,
however, have tightened the Dennis standard. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298, 318 (1957) (advocacy of abstract doctrine cannot be punished while advocacy of ac-
tion can). The last authoritative statement of the Court's position on the minimum protec-
tion afforded speech came in Brandenburg: "[G]uarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation ex-
cept where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
The "incitement" standard with its emphasis on "imminent lawless action" should provide
substantial first amendment protection. The Brandenburg opinion cited Dennis, although
Justices Black and Douglas voiced concerns over the application of the test and in partic-
ular the potential for misuse and manipulation by both legislators and judges. Id. at 449-
54 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring). For various discussions of the clear and present
danger test, see Z. CHAsuE. supra note 5 (defense of the test); A. MIEKLEJOHN, supra note 5
(critical of test as insufficiently protective of speech); Linde, "Clear and Present Danger"
Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970)
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A. Clear and Present Danger31
Although suppression of ideas is not a legitimate govern-
mental interest, speech that incites the listener to take unlawful
action may justify governmental control. 37 Thus, a state could
never constitutionally suppress the idea that a public officer's sal-
ary should be lowered. The issue in Brown under the clear and
present danger test is whether a state may proscribe a candidate's
campaign statement to serve at a reduced salary because it incites
the electorate to unlawfully sell their votes to thecandidate. This
can only be answered by applying the clear and present danger
test to the actual facts of the case. 38
To Justice Brandeis, the clear and present danger test meant
that "only an emergency can justify suppression." 3 The current
formulation of the test, cast in terms of an incitement standard,
retains the Brandeis element of urgency. In Brandenburg v.
Ohio,40 the Court held that speech advocating unlawful action
could be suppressed only when it "is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action." 41 The Court's statement of the clear and present
danger test in Brandenburg erects a formidable barrier to gov-
ernment control over speech.42 The test directs the Court to focus
(limits the test to cases where statute punishes conduct and the speech at issue is claimed to
be a violation); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 313 (1952) (discusses test in context of Dennis).
36 The clear and present danger test has been applied in a variety of contexts. See,
e.g., Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974) (struck down loyalty oath sta-
tute); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (struck down criminal syndicalism statute pro-
scribing advocacy of use of force or law violation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963) (reversed breach of peace conviction for marching on statehouse grounds);
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (reversed contempt of court penalty for alleged in-
terference with administration of justice); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (struck
down registration requirement for labor organizers); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (struck down littering ordinance banning the passing out of leaflets).
37 395 U.S. 444.
38 A major debate in the area of the clear and present danger test specifically, and
free speech values generally, is whether competing interests should be weighed on an "ad
hoe" basis or weighed on a more "definitional" basis framing rules of general application.
This Comment strikes the balance at a case level. See generally Nimmer, The Right to
Speak From "Times" to "Time" First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misap-
plied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 939-48 (1968).
39 Whitneyv. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
40 395 U.S. at 444 (1969).
41 Id. at 447.
42 See generally Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amend-
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on the actual content and context 43 of the speech in question to
determine whether it can be suppressed. Two cases of the Brand-
enburg era serve to demonstrate the need to focus on the actual
conditions of the speech.
In Hess v. Indiana,44 the Court reversed a disorderly conduct
conviction that was based on intemperate speech 45 at a campus
anti-war demonstration. The Court made its own evaluation of
the speech content and context saying that "there was no evi-
dence, or rational inference from the import of the language that
his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, im-
minent disorder." 46 In Watts v. United States,47 the Court over-
turned the petitioner's conviction for threatening to kill the Pres-
ident.48 The Court recognized "an overwhelming [government]
interest'49 in protecting the President, but cautioned that speech
must be "taken in context."' 0 The Court emphasized "the pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on pub-
lic issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."," The
Court added that "[tihe lafiguage of the political arena... is
often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.."5 2
Thus, an irrebuttable presumptione that a candidate's cam-
paign promise to serve for a reduced salary is aimed at and likely
ment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REy. 719 (1975); Linde, supra
note 34.
43 BeVier, supra note 7, at 339. See Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision),
slip op. at 11 ("[Tlhe precise nature of the promise, the conditions upon which it is given,
the circumstances under which it is made, ... all might.., bear upon the constitution-
al assessment.").
44414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
45 The petitioner's exacts words were "[w]e'll take the fucking street later (or
again)." Id. at 107.46Id. at 109. It should be noted that the dissenters thought Hess' words could be
characterized as inciting words and that they criticized the majority's review of the evi-
dence. Id. (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
48 The alleged threat was "[ilf they ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want
to get in my sights is L.B.J." Id. at 706.
49 Id. at 707.
50 Id. at 708.
51 Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270). See Brown v.
Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 16 ("the atmosphere of robust political de-
bate protected by the First Amendment").
52394 U.S. at 708.
53 The irrebuttable presumption analysis was first stated in Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973) (involving tuition preferences for in-state students), and has been invoked
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to incite voters to corruption ignores the dictates of the clear and
present danger test. Using that test, the campaign statement be-
fore the Court in Brown would warrant protection since the facts
reveal no imminent threat to the integrity of the electoral pro-
cess. 54
The clear and present danger test has also consistently been
applied to contempt cases involving alleged interference with
the administration of justice. In Wood v. Georgia,56 which in-
volved publications allegedly interfering with a grand jury inves-
tigation, the Court recognized that when the exercise of the con-
tempt power is confronted with a free speech challenge "the bur-
in other cases. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (manda-
tory pregnancy leaves for school teachers). Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(right of father to custody of illegitimate children). This analysis was used to invalidate
legislative generalizations on due process grounds "when that presumption is not necessar-
ily or universally true in fact." 412 U.S. at 452. The irrebuttable presumption analysis has
been criticized as too extreme. See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 87 HAsv. L. REV. 1534 (1974). While the doctrine was rejected as a gen-
eral approach in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the Court preserved it for cases
that involve interests with "constitutionally protected status." Id. at 772.
54 Without framing the issue in free speech terms, the trial court in Brown was
rather faithful to the first amendment analysis urged here. See note 14 supra for a discus-
sion of the trial court's approach in Brown. The context in which a statement is made is an
integral part of free speech analysis. In Brown, the context in which the campaign promise
was made strongly suggests that the promise was an expression of a part of Brown's polit-
ical platform. Moreover, the promise actually contemplated the legislative process reduc-
ing the salary; in order to save the taxpayers $36,000 over a four year term, the salary of
all three of the county commissioners, as provided for in KRS § 67.040(1) (1970), would
have had to be lowered. This fact necessarily implies that Brown and his running mate
would together vote the salary down. The fact that the salary reduction could not legally
take effect until the following term, Ky. CONST. §§ 161,235, should not change the consti-
tutional analysis because constitutional protection does not turn upon the truth of what is
expressed. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271. Concern for misleading and
false statements is a factor primarily only in commercial speech cases. Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748. In the political
arena, opposing candidates and a discerning public can expose the truth for themselves.
s Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (reversed court order restrain-
ing reporters from publishing allegedly prejudicial pretrial material); Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375 (1962) (reversed contempt order of county sheriff for publishing critical re-
marks allegedly interfering with grand jury investigation); Craig v. Haney, 331 U.S. 367
(reversed contempt convictions of newspaper editor who, in effort to influence lay judge
on pending motion for new trial in private lawsuit, published inaccurate reports of judge's
action); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (reversed contempt conviction of petitioner
who published criticism of pending court proceedings). These cases, involving alleged in-
terference with the administration of justice, are analogous to the Brown case, which in-
volves an alleged interference with the electoral process. ,
0 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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den [is upon the court] to define the limitations upon the con-
tempt power according to the terms of the Federal Constitu-
tion." 57 This reflects an awareness that powers, whether a court's
contempt power or a state's power to regulate elections,-" do not
exist in a vacuum. The constitutional right sets the scope of com-
peting rights.
The Wood Court criticized the lower court for "not indicat-
[ing] . . . how the publications interfered with the grand jury's
investigation." 59 As in the Brandenburg line of cases, the concern
for "factual support," 6 and a requirement that the facts show
that "the danger ... immediately imperil[s]," 'G ' are evident.
Furthermore, the Wood Court echoed the solution of Justice
Brandeis to the problem of "bad" speech: "The remedy to be ap-
plied is more speech."62 In the context of the contempt convic-
tion, the Court stated that "[tihe petitioner's attack on the charge
to the grand jury would have ... an impeding influence on
the... investigation only if the charge ... could not stand in-
spection."' ' In other words, a justification for government ac-
tion, based on any paternalistic notion of protecting the people
who cannot protect themselves, contradicts the basic tenets of
freedom of speech. 4 Thus, if the Court had applied the clear and
present danger test, the campaign promise would have been con-
57 Id. at 383.
5 The Constitution grants to the states power over the administration of elections for
national office. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. See Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court De-
cision), slip op. at 7 ("States have a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of their
electoral processes."). Nevertheless, "in exercising their powers of supervision over elec-
tions. . . .the States may not infringe upon basic constitutional protections." Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973). Likewise, the Constitution places limits on state election
laws. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (apportion-
ment). See Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1111 (1975), for a
study of state regulation of elections and campaigns.
59 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. at 387.
'o Id. at 388.
1 Id. at 385.
2 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 377. See Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court
Decision), slip op. at 16 ("In a political campaign, a candidate's factual blunder is unlikely
to escape the notice of, and correction by, the erring candidate's political opponent.").
63 370 U.S. at 391.
64 Id. Accord First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92. See Brown v. Hartlage
(Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 14-15 ("[The First] Amendment embodies our trust-
in the free exchange of ideas as the means by which the people are to choose between good
ideas and bad, and between cardidates for political office.").
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stitutionally protected political speech because it does not immi-
nently threaten the electoral process.6 As the Supreme Court
held in Brown, constitutional protection is afforded Brown's
campaign statement under the compelling state interest test as
well.
B. Compelling State Interest Test
The prohibition of a campaign promise to serve for a reduced
salary may also be examined from the perspective of whether
there is a compelling state interest that is served by the prohibi-
tion. The crucial inquiries under this analysis are whether the
state interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process is
sufficient to prohibit the campaign statement and whether the
prohibition operates without a chilling effect on protected ex-
pression.
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,6 the Court artic-
dated the compelling state interest test: "[W]here. . .a prohi-
bition is directed at speech . . . intimately related to the process
of governing, 'the State may prevail only upon showing a subor-
dinating interest which is compelling.' "67 Such subordinating in-
terest is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to the valida-
tion of the challenged legislation. As the Court in Buckley v.
Valeo68 asserted, the "means [must be] closely drawn to avoid un-
necessary abridgment."69 The standards embodied in the test de-
65 Before shifting the focus of analysis from what constitutes a clear and present dan-
ger to what constitutes a compelling state interest in first amendment adjudication, the
sensitive issue of the scope of judicial review should be explicitly noted. The problem is
whether the courts or the legislatures are going to identify and evaluate the dangers and
the interests involved in laws which impinge on first amendment freedoms. The Court
specifically dealt with the issue in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829 (1978), observing that "[a] legislature appropriately inquires into and may declare the
reasons impelling legislative action but the judicial function commands analysis of whe-
ther the specific conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute and if so whether the
legislation is consonant with the Constitution." Id. at 844. Accord Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946). But see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 559. For a discussion of
judicial review, see A. BICKEL, supra note 4; L. LEvY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME
COURT (1967). -
66 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
67 Id. at 786 (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)). Accord
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 530.
68 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
69 Id. at 25. See Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 8 ("WNhen
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rive from the overriding principle of first amendment cases that
"it is the character of the right, not of the limitation"1 0 that gov-
erns the balance struck between a state interest and freedom of
speech. Thus, a state cannot validly justify a prohibition on the
making of a particular campaign promise because it is somehow
an insignificant limitation on the "right [of a candidate] to en-
gage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tireless-
ly to advocate his own election."'71 Stated alternatively, if the
state interest is to prove compelling, it must actually and specif-
ically be served by the suppression of speech. As the Court has
observed, "laws which ...affect the exercise of [free speech]
... cannot be sustained merely because they... provide a
helpful means of dealing with . . . an evil."' 2 Under the facts of
Brown, the legitimate interest the state has in protecting the in-
tegrity of the electoral process by proscribing bribery and the
buying of votes surely is not served by prohibiting Brown's pro-
mise made to the public at large in the context of communicating
his views on the public issue of the fiscal responsibility of govern-
ment.73 Furthermore, given the myriad of campaign promises
that are part and parcel of political campaigns, the impermissi-
ble chilling effect on "the free discussion of governmental af-
fairs"74 that would result from a restriction on such a promise is
manifest. 7-
The Buckley Court recognized a "substantial government
interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in
the electoral process." 78 However, the recognition in Buckley that
the interest in preventing even the "appearance" of corruption
can justify limitations on campaign contributions does not neces-
a State seeks to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First
Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported not only by a
legitimate state interest, but by a compelling one, and that the restriction operate without
unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.").
70 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. at 530.
71 Buckley v. Valo, 424 U.S. at 52.
7 2 United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967). Contra id. at 233 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
73 See Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 11-13.
74 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. at 218.
75 See Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 15.
78 424 U.S. at 47-48. Buckley involved a comprehensive challenge to various contri-
butions and expenditures provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86
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sarily mean that the same interest can be used to justify a prohi-
bition of campaign statements. A candidate, while speaking on
campaign matters, is engaging in "pure speech" 77 in the tradition
of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" 8 debate, while the
Buckley Court characterized financial contributions as "sym-
bolic" speech. 79 This constitutional distinction illustrates the
necessary subtleties involved in protecting fragile first amend-
ment freedoms.
Moreover, nothing in the Buckley "appearance" rationale
undermines the principle of examining the actual context of
speech.8" That is, it requires little imagination to see that "large
individual financial contributions" may "appear" to act as a cor-
rupting influence, thus "[eroding] confidence in the system of
representative [g]overnment." 81 Considering the "political hyper-
bole" 82 characteristic of the campaign process, however, it is not
so easy to consider a single campaign statement as "appearing"
corrupt. In fact, automatically voiding the election of a candi-
date who, under the facts, has made a statement in good faith in
the process of communicating his views to the electorate, can
only damage the "system of representative [g]overnment." Such
paternalism has no place in free speech values; as the Court has
stated:
[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsi-
bility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflict-
ing arguments. They may consider, in making their judgment,
Stat. 3, as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified
in 18 U.S.C. § 608 (Supp. IV 1970) (repealed 1976)).
77 See note 21 supra for the distinction between "speech" and "conduct." The special
protection afforded "pure speech" has been established in many decisions. E.g., Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
78 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
79 424 U.S. at 21. For a discussion of Buckley and Bellotti, see Birnbaum, The Con-
stitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act After First National Bank of-Boston v.
Bellotti, 28 AM. U.L. REv. 149 (1979).
80 See notes 14 and 54 supra for the factual considerations that must inform the bal-
ancing process. Whatever compelling interest the state may have in "stemming the reality
or appearance of corruption in the electoral process," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 47-48,
it is not served by suppressing the promise Brown made in expressing his views to the pub-
lic at large.
81 Id. at 27.
82 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. at 708.
83 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 27. The Court's concern for the voting right is mani-
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the source and credibility of the advocate. But if there be any
danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and
arguments advanced.. ., it is a danger contemplated by the
Framers of the First Amendment.&
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONss
Directly applying the compelling state interest test, the
United States Supreme Court in Brown unanimously held
Brown's campaign promise to be within "the realm of unequiv-
ocal protection that the Constitution affords to political
speech." 86 The Court "acknowledg[ed] that the States have a le-
gitimate interest in preserving the integrity of their electoral pro-
cesses,"8 7 but found, under the facts in Brown, that the interest
was not sufficiently compelling to overcome the competing first
amendment values.
The Court identified and rejected three possible justifications
for the Kentucky ban on a candidate's public campaign promise
Lest. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 562. ("[T]he right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights .... ). See
Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 16 ("There has been no showing
in this case that petitioner made the disputed statement other than in good faith and with-
out knowledge of its falsity, or that he made the statement with reckless disregard whether
it was false or not. Moreover, petitioner retracted the statement promptly after discover-
ing that it might have been false. Under these circumstances, nullifying petitioner's elec-
tion victory was inconsistent with the atmosphere of robust political debate protected by
the First Amendment.").
84 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791-92.
8 All of this Comment's foregoing discussion was based on an independent analysis
of the Brown case before the Supreme Court rendered its decision. Since the Court made
its decision before the final printing of this Comment, the author has updated the preceed-
ing discussion through minor changes in such things as emphasis, sentence structure and
verb tense. The foregoing analysis is, in the author's view, wholly consistent with the
unanimous Supreme Court decision holding Brown's promise constitutionally protected
political speech. Although the Supreme Court's opinion did not discuss the clear and pres-
ent danger test, the major points made under the rubric of that section, see text accom-
panying notes 36-65 supra, are included in the Court's opinion. For example, the Brown
Court acknowledged that the actual content and context of a candidate's campaign state-
ment "bear upon the constitutional assessment." Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Deci-
sion), slip op. at 11. Also, the Court emphasized its adherence to the position first artic-
ulated by Justice Brandeis in a case applying the clear and present danger test: the proper
constitutional remedy for so-called subversive, bad, corrupt, or false speech is "more
speech, not enforced silence." Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 16
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 377).
86 Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 12.
8 7 Id. at 6-7. The Court did not void on its face any part of KRS § 121.055 (1982);
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to serve for less than the salary set by state law. First, the Court
rejected the respondent's analogy of the promise to vote buying.
Emphasizing the public nature of Brown's statement "made
openly, subject to the comment and criticism of his political op-
ponent and to the scrutiny of the voters,"s 8 the Court found "no
constitutional basis"89 for equating the statement with "a candi-
date's promise to pay voters for their support from his own poc-
ketbook." 9 The Court reasoned that Brown's "generalized com-
mitment'l was "conditional not on any particular vote'or votes
but entirely on the majority's vote,"92 involving no "quid pro quo
arrangement." 93 Thus, the Court held that "a candidate's pro-
mise to confer some ultimate benefit on the voter, qua taxpayer,
citizen or member of the general public, does not lay beyond the
pale of First Amendment protection." 94
The second potential state interest-the possible result that
persons of independent wealth but less ability might be elected
over those who could not afford to serve at a reduced salary-
was also rejected by the Court. It found that any such paternalis-
tic "fear that voters might make an ill-advised choice [did] not
provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting
speech."95
The final potential justification identified and rejected by the
Court involved the state interest in preventing inaccurate, false
or misleading statements."6 Brown's promise was "false" in the
sense that, because the salary for the commissioner's office was
fixed by law, Brown could not have unilaterally delivered on his
rather, the statute was held unconstitutional as applied to the particular facts in Brown.
Id. at 16. See note 33 supra for a discussion of the overbreadth analysis.
8 Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 11.
89 Id.
9Od.
91 Id. at 12.
92 d.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 13. Incorporating some political theory in its opinion, the Court-citing
THE FEDERAL!ST Nos. 10 & 51-observed that "our tradition of political pluralism is part-
ly predicated on the expectation that voters will pursue their individual good through the
political process, and that the summation of these individual pursuits will further the col-
lective welfare." Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 10.
95 Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 15.
" See note 54 supra for the factual setting resulting in Brown's inability to carry out
his promise and a discussion of the position that this should have no effect on the constitu-
tional analysis.
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promise. 7 The Court's response9 8 was that "erroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate, and.. . it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
'need... to survive."' 99 Observing that "in a political cam-
paign, a candidate's factual blunder is unlikely to escape the no-
tice and correction by the erring candidate's political oppo-
nent," 11 0 the Court invoked the sentiment of Justice Brandeis that
"the preferred First Amendment remedy [is] 'more speech, not
enforced silence.'"'1 Given Brown's "good faith" 102 in making
the promise, the Court found that voiding his election "was in-
97 See notes 15, 32, and 54 supra for descriptive background regarding the nature
and circumstances of Brown's promise.
98 The Court discussed the issue of the state's interest in preventing erroneous state-
ments in terms of the libel cases of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. The New York Times case represented a
breakthrough in constitutional law, affording constitutional protection to libelous state-
ments that had previously-under state law-been without constitutional protection. See
generally Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the Central Meaning of the First
Amendment, 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191. See note 26 supra for a discussion of certain cat-
egories of speech, like libel, historically receiving less constitutional protection. The New
York Times case set a standard under which "public officials" could recover in defamation
cases if the defendant had made the statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reck-
less disregard for whether it was false or not. 376 U.S. at 279-80. See note 83 supra for the
language of the standard as stated in Brown. The Gertz case relaxed the "actual malice"
standard of the New York Times case as it applied to private plaintiffs (i.e., individuals
who are not public officials), establishing that in such instances a negligence standard
would suffice. 418 U.S. at 350.
These libel cases and their progeny represent a rather complex and special area of
the law, and one might agree with Justice Rehnquist's reservations expressed in his concur-
rence in Brown v. Hartlage that "Mills v. Alabama ... affords ample basis for reaching
the result at which the Court arrives." Brown v. Hartlage, No. 80-1285 (U.S. Apr. 5,
1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result). See note 9 supra and accompanying text for
the thrust of Mills. Justice Rehnquist's opinion expresses concern that the state interest in
protecting the integrity of the electoral process will not be given enough weight in the
future if the analogy is drawn to the state interest in protecting individuals from defama-
tion. The majority, however, explicitly recognized "the State[s'] . . .legitimate interest in
preserving the integrity of their electoral processes," Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court
Decision), slip op. at 7; the Court's mention of the New York Times case malice standard
merely seems to give appropriate regard to a scienter element which, if it had been pres-
ent, would have cast a different light on the nature of Brown's promise.
99 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272-73 (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. at 433).
100 Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 16.
101 Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 377).
102 Brown v. Hartlage (Supreme Court Decision), slip op. at 16. See note 98 supra
for a discussion of the Court's use of the New York Times standard of knowing or reckless
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consistent with the atmosphere of robust political debate pro-
tected by the First Amendment."' 1 3
CONCLUSION
To constitutionally sanction the prohibition of a campaign
promise that is tenuously likened to a bribe would pose a grave
danger to the carefully constructed web of protection afforded
political speech under first amendment jurisprudence. More-
over, it would inject an unwarranted paternalistic element into
constitutional values which ignores the rights, duties, and com-
petence of the people in choosing their representatives. The Su-
preme Court in Brown firmly rejected either result.
The paradox and the tension inherent in the right of "free-
dom of speech" demands the most judicious balancing process by
a Court entrusted with its application to human affairs. A system
of government, albeit imperfect, yet infused with noble values,
depends upon the free exercise of its most preferred freedom.
Martha Dugan Rehm
falsity in reaching its conclusion that Brown's promise was indeed within the realm of con-
stitutionally protected political speech.
103 Id.
